From Progressive Response 13 October 2000 Vol. 4, No. 39    Website:  http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/

(Editor's Note: The U.S. drug war in Latin America is destabilizing the region, as U.S. military aid and training are bolstering the security forces, undermining the region?s tenuous democratization process, and creating economic turmoil. The guerrilla war in Colombia and President Fujimori's political crisis in Peru have focused public attention on the risks and consequences of a U.S. foreign policy in Latin America that is shaped by drug control efforts. Although it has not yet made headlines in the U.S., the recent outbreak of civil unrest in Bolivia also has its roots in a foreign policy that is badly out of step with the economic and political conditions in Latin America. The following report on the escalating tensions in Bolivia was taken from a new Foreign Policy In Focus policy brief--
posted at :http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol5/v5n38bolivia.html
that focuses on the impact of the U.S. drug war in this impoverished Andean country.)

In September 2000, Bolivia, South America?s poorest country, was rocked by a series of civilian protests, including roadblocks throughout the country. Unionists, teachers, peasant coca farmers, and others have demanded that the Bolivian and U.S. government stop efforts to completely eradicate coca growing and to build three new military bases in the Chapare region. Protesters are also demanding that the government increase teachers? salaries, eliminate tariffs on water and electricity, and improve alternative development programs in the coca-growing region.

Bolivia is weighed down by a tremendous foreign debt of $6.2 billion, according to 1999 World Bank figures. Much of this debt was incurred during the 1970s, when Bolivia was plagued by military dictatorships. But particular fury is directed at President Hugo Banzer's neoliberal economic policies and his inability to move the country out of its severe economic crisis, as well as his heavy-handed antinarcotics efforts, involving forced eradication with a target of no coca production beyond that grown for domestic use by the end of 2000. Most heavily affected are Bolivia?s indigenous people who comprise over 50% of the population.

Banzer was Bolivia's military dictator from 1971 to 1978, when he was widely accused of profiting personally from the cocaine business. He reentered politics in 1997, winning only 23% of the popular vote, which led to an unwieldy and ineffectual coalition government. Despite Banzer's unsavory history, the U.S. has continued to back him, largely because he is carrying out war on drugs policies.

With the end of the cold war, U.S. military policy in Latin America has shifted from fighting communism to fighting drugs. This ?war? has focused on the lowest, most vulnerable rung of the drug ladder: the coca growers and the drug industry workers. Unlike Peru and Colombia, where antidrug efforts have been combined with controlling guerrilla warfare, Bolivia has no guerilla movement so the full force of repression has been felt by the 35,000 coca-growing families.

Coca is not cocaine: the leaf has been consumed for over 2,000 years in the Andes and, when chewed or taken as a tea, provides a mild stimulant which decreases hunger, fatigue, and altitude sickness. While traditional use continues, the coca leaf, the source for cocaine, has become Bolivia?s main crop export, making Bolivia the world?s third-largest coca cultivator. Since 1995, U.S.-financed war on drugs policies appear to have had considerable success in slowing down Bolivian and Peruvian production, but much coca was replanted in more remote areas. In addition, Colombian growers have picked up the slack, with the result of little or no net reduction in world cocaine production. Banzer claims eradication efforts have reduced coca production by more than half. In April 2000, 5,000 troops moved into the Chapare coca-growing region in Cochabamba province. Popular forces calling for democracy are growing in Bolivia, and the U.S. is standing on the wrong side. Bolivians from a wide spectrum of political persuasions resent U.S. economic and military policies and interference in their internal affairs. But because President Banzer and his small coterie of collaborators need the U.S. dollars, they continue to bow down to the Yankees.

U.S. policies in Bolivia should be geared to eradication of poverty, not coca. About 70% of Bolivians live below the poverty line, per capita income is only around $1,000 per year, and social indicators are appallingly low, similar to sub-Saharan African countries.

The U.S. must first stop its war on drugs strategy based on forced crop eradication and drop the zero coca option for the Chapare. More fundamentally, the U.S. needs to concentrate on controlling drug use primarily through education and treatment in the U.S., rather than eradication and interdiction in the Andean source countries. U.S. antinarcotics operations and assistance should target for arrest and prosecution money-laundering and trafficking kingpins, not small-time growers and users.

Second, the U.S. should stop funding for the military barracks at the Bolivian armed forces? three new bases in the Chapare. If built, these bases will likely be used to carry out attacks on peasant growers, increasing the Bolivian military?s already sorry human rights record. Any U.S. military assistance to Bolivia should be for protection of its borders, not for controlling its civilian population.

Third, the Leahy Amendment must be carefully enforced in Bolivia. This provision states that no U.S. funding can go to police and military units implicated in human rights violations when those responsible have not been prosecuted.

Fourth, the U.S. should drop its annual drug certification charade which forces Bolivia and other drug-producing and -exporting countries--under pain of loss of U.S. aid--to demonstrate, at least in the days before the administration issues its report card, some level of support for the war on drugs. This program is deeply resented by Bolivians and other Latin Americans who see this process as U.S. meddling in their internal affairs. In terms of economic policy, the U.S. should use its influence with the international financial institutions (IFIs) to push for full cancellation of foreign debts owed by Bolivia and the other most heavily indebted countries. In April 2000, the debt relief provided by the U.S. and other most industrialized countries (the G-8) led to reduction in Bolivia?s debt servicing by 27%, but this is far from adequate.

In addition, the U.S. should stop tying its aid to structural adjustment policies that have hurt the poor and working and middle classes of Bolivia for 15 years now.

U.S.-backed alternative development programs must include the majority of Chapare-based peasants, who want such programs to be of their own design and implementation, rather than imposed by outside "experts." Marketing of traditional crops, agricultural extension, and infrastructure development, including agro-industrial facilities, are all needed.

On the political front, the U.S. should only support the Bolivian government if it is upholding democratic processes and the rule of law. Banzer did not win a majority of the popular vote in the 1997 election, and many believe that this disaccord within his coalition government has made the administration ungovernable. Thus, in Bolivia as in Peru, there are increasing doubts about the legitimacy of the president, as well as his ability to govern. Given the U.S' stated objectives of promoting democracy and human rights in the region, the U.S. government should give serious weight to civilian petitions for new elections, and should take a strong stance against human rights violations committed by the Banzer government.

(This brief was written by George Ann Potter who is based in Cochabamba, Bolivia and Linda Farling who is co-founder of the Andean Information Network and is based in Ithaca, New York. Gina Amatangelo, a Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, provided background information.)

Sources for More Information

Organizations Andean Information Network Email: paz@albatros.cnb.net Website: http://www.scbbs-bo.com/ain/

Centro Integral de Desarrollo Económico y Social (CIDES) Email: gapotter@albatros.cnb.net

Washington Office on Latin America Email: wola@wola.org Website: http://www.wola.org/

European Network on Debt and Development Secretariat Email: eurodad@ngonet.be Website: http://www.oneworld.org/eurodad/

Websites
Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia http://www.cedib.org/

Jubilee 2000 - Bolivia http://www.jubileo.ucb.edu.bo/

Jubilee 2000 - World http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/

Resource Center of the Americas http://www.americas.org/

Visit the Foreign Policy In Focus website, http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/

IRC Tom Barry Editor, Progressive Response Co-director, Foreign Policy In Focus Email: tom@irc-online.org

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