NMD update From BASIC 10/04/01

There are six items this week.

The first piece is a report from the CATO Institute examining the nature of the threat posed to the United States by so-called "rogue states". The report argues that US threat assessments do not pay sufficient attention to the intentions of these nations and focus too exclusively on their capabilities. The report argues that encouraging political developments in countries like North Korea and Iran would perhaps be a more fruitful means of increasing US security than attempting to build a missile defence shield.

The second piece, a report from the Carnegie non-Proliferation Project, assesses the current state of ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East. While highly unnerving, it does appear that efforts to acquire ballistic missile technology on the part of these states is motivated more by regional concerns than by an attempt to threaten either the United States or Europe.

The third piece concerns a recent assessment by the Ballistic Missile Defence Organization of the cost of the various missile defence systems it is currently developing. Excluding possible additional programs that might be requested by the new Bush Administration, the projected figure offered is in excess of $100 billion.

The fourth item is a report on the current state of the NMD systems testing programme. Already way behind schedule it looks as though the next test may be delayed until some time in the summer owing to technical difficulties.

The fifth item details the latest news concerning the nomination of John Bolton to the post of under-secretary of state for arms control and international security and the last piece are three useful missile defence related links on the CEIP website.

I hope this is useful. If you have any comments or suggestions regarding this service please e-mail me at mbromley@basicint.org. If you would like to know more about the work of BASIC please visit our website at http://www.basicint.org.

1) "The Rogue State Doctrine and National Missile Defense" by Ivan Eland with Daniel Lee of the Cato Institute
2) "Missile Arsenals in the Middle East", PROLIFERATION BRIEF, Vol. IV - No. 3, March 15, 2001
3) "U.S. Missile-Defense Costs To Exceed $100 Billion" by John M. Donnelly, Defense Week, 2 April 2001
4) "NMD, Live-Launch Booster Tests Continue To Slip" Aerospace Daily, 28 March 2001
5) "The Armageddon Nominee", Editorial, The Boston Globe, April 2, 2001
6) Useful Missile Defence links on CEIP website

1) "The Rogue State Doctrine and National Missile Defense" by Ivan Eland with Daniel Lee

Ivan Eland is director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute. Daniel Lee was a research assistant at the Cato Institute.

Executive Summary
The Clinton administration underestimated the technological ability of several of the "rogue" states to develop long-range missiles and politicized its intelligence estimate. However, missile threats to the United States from any one of those states also depend on the intentions of that state and political developments that might affect those intentions.

Since early 1999 significant positive political developments have occurred in the "rogue" states most likely to develop long-range missiles. The United States has agreed to lift some of the economic sanctions against North Korea-the nation that would first have the technological capability to threaten the United States with missiles- in exchange for a suspension of its testing of missiles. North Korea is rapidly improving its relations with South Korea and the West. Iran-the next most capable "rogue" nation in missile technology-is haltingly liberalizing at home and improving relations with its neighbors and the West. That thaw could eventually lead to improving relations with the United States. Iraq's missile capability continues to be hampered by the effects of wars and embargoes on military technology.

Such positive political developments would allow the Bush administration to slow the development and deployment of a limited land-based national missile defense. More time can be taken to thoroughly develop and test under realistic conditions the most technologically challenging weapon ever built (so far test results have been mixed). Even if, despite favorable international developments, the threat arises quickly, rushing deployment of missile defense will ultimately delay the fielding and increase the cost of a system that actually works.

For the full report visit http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb65.pdf

2) "Missile Arsenals in the Middle East", PROLIFERATION BRIEF, Vol. IV - No. 3, March 15, 2001

by the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project

In a region where tensions are high but distances between capitals are short, ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East is cause for concern. This brief summarizes the detailed information on missile proliferation available at the Project's web site - www.ceip.org/npp.

Egypt
Egypt has devoted considerable resources to missile development, collaborating over the years with a number of foreign countries to acquire missiles and associated technology. After obtaining Scud-B missiles from the Soviet Union in the 1970s, Egypt transferred Scuds to North Korea, where the system was successfully reverse-engineered. Today, Egypt fields Frog-7 rockets (70 km) and short-range Scud B missiles (300 km). It is believed that Egypt can also field the Scud-C (500 km) or a closely related variant, both of which may have benefited from North Korean assistance.

Israel
The most capable military power in the region, Israel fields both short-range Jericho I (500 km) and medium-range Jericho II (1,500 km) missiles. Both missiles use solid propellant. Israel's successful satellite launches using the Shavit space launch vehicle directly suggest that Israel could quickly develop missile platforms with much longer ranges then the Jericho II.

Syria
According to the U.S. Department of Defense's January 2001 edition of Proliferation: Threat and Response, Syria "has increasingly relied on a strategic deterrent based on ballistic missiles and chemical warfare capabilities, as the ultimate guarantor of regime survival." Syria fields Frog-7 rockets and SS-21 (100 km), Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. In September 2000, Syria flight-tested a longer-range Scud-D missile (700 km). Proliferation 2001 also reports that Syria is drawing on foreign sources for "equipment and assistance" in an attempt to develop a short-range, solid-fueled ballistic missile.

Libya
Libya fields Frog-7 rockets, Scud B missiles and the domestically-produced Al Fatah (200 km) missile. The Qadhafi regime has also sought to build or acquire medium-range missiles. U.S. efforts to deny missile technology to Libya, coupled with U.N. sanctions imposed in the wake of the Lockerbie bombing, hampered this quest and eroded maintenance of existing forces. The suspension of sanctions last year, however, has allowed Libya to "expand its [missile technology] procurement effort," according to the CIA's most recent Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Iran
Iran possesses one of the largest missile arsenals in the region with hundreds of deployed rockets and Scud short-range missiles. Iran also possesses the CSS-8 (150 km) short-range missile, purchased from China. Substantial North Korean assistance has provided Iran with the ability to produce Scuds indigenously. Iran also produces a series of unguided rockets with ranges of over 100 km, including the solid-fueled Zelzal system.

Tehran is aggressively pursuing foreign technology in an attempt to develop the medium-range Shehab III (1,300 km). Based on North Korea's No Dong and flight-tested for the third time in September 2000, the U.S. alleges that the Shehab III benefits substantially from Russian technology.

U.S. officials have testified before Congress that Tehran could soon deploy the Shehab III and "probably has a small number ? available for use in a conflict." Official Iranian statements also make reference to longer-range missiles called the Shehab-IV and Shehab-V. Little is known about these projects, although the Shehab-IV is rumored to be based on the old Soviet SS-4 missile.

Iraq
Iraq has used missiles extensively in warfare, targeting Tehran with missiles during the spring 1988 "War of the Cities" and firing nearly 90 Scud missiles during the Gulf War.

Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq cannot have missiles with ranges greater then 150 km. Although many Iraqi Scuds were destroyed under U.N. supervision, fears remain that several dozen missiles remain unaccounted for and may have escaped destruction. Furthermore, Iraq's solid-fueled Ababil 100 and liquid-fueled Al Samoud projects allow it to maintain missile production lines that could quickly be upgraded for longer-range missile production if sanctions are dropped.

Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia purchased several dozen medium-range CSS-2 (2,600 km) missiles in 1987 from China, giving it the longest-range systems in the Middle East. The current condition and maintenance of these systems is not known, although some are believed to remain operational.

3) "U.S. Missile-Defense Costs To Exceed $100 Billion" by John M. Donnelly, Defense Week, 2 April 2001

Building and maintaining all the major U.S. missile-defense programs will cost far in excess of $100 billion, according to the latest Pentagon figures, which were provided to Defense Week.

Developing and producing just the eight highest-profile anti-missile systems will cost about $80 billion, most of it by 2010, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization says. In some cases, though, that acquisition cost is incomplete: It covers only research, not production; or it includes only a part of a planned purchase.

Moreover, when the "life cycle cost" of operating and supporting-not just buying-those systems is added, the figure balloons to roughly $115 billion. But that too is far from complete, because the missile-defense agency couldn?t state the support costs for half its top systems. So the total cost is undoubtedly billions of dollars more than $115 billion.

Despite keen international interest in these programs, the Pentagon?s estimated price for its top strategic and tactical missile defense efforts has not previously been published, experts say.

The new BMDO figures are still not a complete answer. But they present the fullest sense yet of the hole that missile defense, whatever its merits, could leave in the military?s wallet. Supporters of missile defense say $10 billion a year or so is just a fraction of the Pentagon?s annual $300 billion budget.

Besides, advocates say, the missile-defense programs are needed to deter or intercept real threats to U.S. citizens. While the numerous anti-missile efforts may seem like overkill, the most effective protection has several tiers, they add.

"We need a layered defense, and they [the systems] are expensive," said Pamelia Bain, a BMDO spokeswoman. Others respond that the Pentagon, even in an age of record projected budget surpluses, cannot afford to pay for the bevy of missile defense programs and at the same time address other military priorities.

"The high demand for missile-defense funds will be a clear competition for military housing, health care, readiness and the transformation of the armed forces," said John Isaacs, an analyst with the Council for a Livable World, an arms-control advocacy group.

Eight top programs
At issue are eight programs, not only the National Missile Defense (NMD) program, but also the Space Based Infrared System-Low-the missile-warning and tracking satellites that will be the missile shield?s vital eyes. Also included are the Navy?s two programs-Navy Area and Navy Theater Wide; the Army?s Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot PAC-3 programs; and two laser efforts: the Space Based Laser and Airborne Laser.

The cost figures are conservative for other reasons. They do not include several Army programs, including the U.S. contribution to the Israeli Arrow program; the anti-rocket laser the Army built for Israel, the Tactical High Energy Laser; nor the Medium Extended Air Defense, a mobile protection for troops. Nor is a multibillion-dollar constellation of missile-warning satellites called SBIRS-High included; nor networks like the Cooperative Engagement Capability, a Navy air and missile defense battle-management network; nor sundry research efforts with application to anti-missile programs-to name a few.

The NMD program is the missile-defense establishment?s most controversial effort. The Pentagon is developing a ground-based system that would defend the United States with interceptors, radars and battle-management computers based in Alaska and elsewhere.

The initial system would comprise 100 interceptors. Developing and building it would cost $20 billion, BMDO says, but the Pentagon?s independent cost crunchers, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group, say $24 billion. When support costs are added, the total grows to $43 billion, BMDO said. Support costs are usually reckoned over 20 years.

The Pentagon discusses no official cost estimates for its "objective"-read, planned-NMD system of 250 interceptors, because the program as budgeted is for just 100 interceptors. If, as some believe, the Bush administration expands that system-by going beyond 100 interceptors on land, or including U.S. allies under the shield or deploying a network at sea or in space-then the price could rise considerably.

The SBIRS-Low satellites would cost $8.2 billion to acquire, but that figure only includes research and development, according to a recent report to Congress. And its support costs add $2.4 billion to the total, BMDO told Defense Week.

The acquisition cost of Navy Area is $7.3 billion, while acquiring the other short-range battlefield defense, the Army PAC-3, costs $10.1 billion, BMDO says. The Navy Theater Wide program, a longer range interceptor system, costs $5.5 billion to develop and test, but that doesn?t include procurement, which hasn?t yet been budgeted.

The Space Based Laser acquisition cost is $3 billion, BMDO says, but that?s only for a current demonstration effort-nothing near the cost to deploy a constellation. The 747-borne Airborne Laser would cost $6.4 billion to buy, but taxpayers can add almost $5 billion to the bill in support costs for the Scud-busting laser planes. The long-range THAAD system?s acquisition price tag is $17 billion, but it requires another $8 billion to operate.

Significantly, BMDO could not provide support costs for the two Navy programs, PAC-3 or for the Space Based Laser-in other words, for half its major programs. That, even though new defense programs are supposed to be designed now with life cycle cost reductions as an objective.

Steve Hildreth, an analyst with the non-partisan Congressional Research Service, said the budget choices for the administration and Congress will be difficult if the missile-defense costs remain as projected. Referring to the new figures, he said: "If true, it seems likely it?s going to force the administration and the Defense Department to make trade-offs as to what procurement items to acquire."

The information used to make defense decisions is not always complete, accurate or in a useable format. For example, the missile-defense cost figures provided to Congress in the quarterly Selected Acquisition Report and the top tester?s annual report are already out of date, incomplete or improperly mix acquisition costs with life cycle costs.

Pentagon Missile-Defense Cost Estimates

NMD: Acquisition Cost -- $24.4 billion, Life Cycle Cost -- $43.2 billion

SBIRS-Low: Acquisition Cost -- $8.2 billion, Life Cycle Cost -- $10.6 billion

Navy Area: Acquisition Cost -- $7.3 billion, Life Cycle Cost -- $??

Navy Theater Wide: Acquisition Cost -- $5.5 billion, Life Cycle Cost -- $??

PAC-3: Acquisition Cost -- $10.1 billion, Life Cycle Cost -- $??

THAAD: Acquisition Cost -- $16.8 billion, Life Cycle Cost -- $23 billion

ABL: Acquisition Cost -- $6.4 billion, Life Cycle Cost -- $11 billion

SBL: Acquisition Cost -- $3 billion, Life Cycle Cost -- $??

Total: Acquisition Cost -- $81.7 billion, Life Cycle Cost -- $??

4) "NMD, Live-Launch Booster Tests Continue To Slip" Aerospace Daily, 28 March 2001

The first live-fire test of the new three-stage, Boeing-built national missile defense (NMD) booster has been delayed by almost a year and a half due to developmental challenges, causing the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to revise live testing of the technology planned for the NMD program.

The first full test of the Boeing booster, originally scheduled for March, 2000, will now take place late this summer, and will be preceded by a "pathfinder" training operation within the next two or three months that includes everything up to an actual launch.

The pathfinder operation - a risk-reduction effort to work the bugs out, according to one Pentagon source - will be followed by two live-fire booster tests, both of which are planned for this year. BMDO hopes to see the second live-fire booster test sometime this fall.

Previous integrated flight tests (IFT) have been conducted using a two-stage Minuteman booster made by Lockheed Martin, but the long-term goal has been to go to Boeing's three-stage booster because of its advantage of speed and range in trying to shoot down a missile with a missile before it re-enters the atmosphere.

Defense Dept. spokesman Rear Adm. Craig Quigley told reporters yesterday that the Pentagon is "always concerned" when a test is delayed because of the "downstream effects," that tend to lead to yet more delays. The NMD program has been plagued with technological glitches and developmental setbacks that have pushed the tests further and further to the right.

The pathfinder and two booster tests are independent of the next IFT tests, two of which are also planned for this year, according to BMDO sources. IFT-6, to take place in May or June, will use the Minuteman booster and is a duplicate of last July's test, which was deemed a failure when the kill vehicle failed to separate from the second stage of Lockheed Martin's payload launch vehicle (DAILY, July 11).

"We're going to make sure that we check and double-check everything," Quigley said, to avoid costly failures such as those in July and January of last year. So far, BMDO has had two out of three failures in testing its national missile defense technology. In January, 2000, the failure was attributed to a malfunction in a Raytheon-built infrared seeker just seconds before an intercept was to take place (DAILY, Jan. 20). BMDO scored its first intercept of a target in the program in October, 1999 (DAILY, Oct. 5).

"These are expensive," said Quigley of the tests. At $100 million an attempt, "We want to make sure we get it right," he said.

BMDO had planned to use the Boeing booster during IFT-7, now slated to take place in late fall of this year. But, "much will depend on how the live-fire booster tests perform," a BMDO spokesperson told The Daily.

Boeing, which is developing its new booster in Sunnyvale, Calif., declined comment on why the technology has been delayed. The company is also the prime contractor for the entire NMD program. In August, 2000, Boeing removed its head executive from the helm of its NMD Lead System Integrator (LSI) program in the wake of perpetual booster problems and schedule delays (DAILY, Aug. 11).

-- Linda de France

5) "The Armageddon Nominee", Editorial, The Boston Globe, April 2, 2001

IF PRESIDENT GEORGE Bush is worried that his appointments to key positions are not pleasing the right wing of his own party, he may take heart from the introduction Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Jesse Helms gave Bush's nominee to be undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, John Bolton.

Bolton, a Helms protege, heard himself praised Thursday by the senator from North Carolina as "one of the best and wisest" nominations Bush has made for "senior foreign policy positions."

Helms made his reasons for kinship with Bolton explicit. He recalled saying at an American Enterprise Institute event that "Bolton is the kind of man with whom I would want to stand at Armageddon, for what the Bible describes as the final battle between good and evil in this world." Helms's political action committee, the National Congressional Club, was represented by Bolton when that PAC was fined for evading campaign finance laws. In turn, Helms backed Bolton for previous positions in the State and Justice departments.

When Bolton was an assistant attorney general in 1989 he refused to provide documents that Senator John Kerry requested on drug trafficking by the Nicaraguan contras. Kerry, who was dubious at Thursday's Foreign Relations Committee hearing about Bolton's professed backing for the 1994 Framework Agreement freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program, asked the nominee if he might be exhibiting a "confirmation conversion."

But the main reason to oppose Bolton for the number three position in the State Department is neither his collaboration with Helms nor his coyness at his confirmation hearing. Bolton does not belong in the arms control job because, as the director of the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project, Joseph Cirincione, says: "Bolton is philosophically opposed to most of the international treaties that comprise the nonproliferation regime."

Characteristically, Helms left no room for ambiguity at Thursday's hearing when he said to Bolton: "John, I want you to take that ABM Treaty and dump it in the same place we dumped our ABM co-signer, the Soviet Union - on the ash heap of history." The 1972 antiballistic missile treaty that Helms and Bolton zealously oppose has served as what Cirincione calls "the cornerstone of strategic stability in the world because it reins in the nuclear forces of the nuclear powers."

Not only the ABM Treaty, but also the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Conference on Disarmament, the verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention and any effort to prevent an arms race in outer space are all valuable instruments for arms control. They would all be imperiled were Bolton to be put in charge of arms control at the State Department.

6) Useful Missile Defence links on CEIP website

The Project tracks official statements on missile defense and nuclear policy made by the Bush Administration and members of Congress. View these statements on the following pages:
Bush administration, missile defense:
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/bushadminmissiledefense.htm

Bush administration, nuclear policy:
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/bushadminnukepolicy.htm

Statements by members of Congress:
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Congressnukesnmd.htm

Mark Bromley
Analyst
British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
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