From   Basic
email:  mbromley@basicint.org
23 March 2001 11:12

NMD Update

There are four items this week. The first is news of an anti-missile defence protest in London on the Saturday the 14th April being organised by CND.

The second item is information about the Bush administration's nominee for the post of Under-secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Bolton's confirmation hearing takes place on the 29th March. If confirmed Bolton will be one of the key officials responsible for developing and implementing US arms control policy. As the information provided by the Council for a Livable World demonstrates, this is a rather worrying proposition.

The third item is a piece by Frank J. Gaffney Jr., President of the Center for Security Policy and staunch NMD advocate. Gaffney argues that along with pressing ahead with early NMD deployment, the US should resist calls to reduce its nuclear arsenal.

The fourth piece is a short item from Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst at Center for Defense Information. The piece looks at the various TMD systems being developed by European countries, and examines how this might impact on US efforts to gain support for its own NMD system.

I would also like to let you know that there is a new page on BASIC's website. The North Atlantic Network's page of local contacts on NMD has now been posted. I would appreciate it if all those who agreed to have their details included would check that the information posted on the website is correct.

1) Announcement of an anti-missile defence protest in London
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is planning a demonstration against missile defence outside Downing Street in Whitehall at High Noon on Saturday 14th April. For further details call CND on 020 7700 2393 (website: www.cnduk.org).

Placards, banners, leaflets, speeches and street theatre - 'Just Say No to Star Wars, Tony' Please circulate, encourage support and make plans to be there on the day.
Nigel Chamberlain CND Press Officer

2) John Bolton; Nominee for Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs
(Compiled by the Council for a Livable World (http://www.clw.org)

White House statement on Bolton: The President intends to nominate John Robert Bolton to be Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. He is currently Senior Vice President for Public Policy Research at the American Enterprise Institute and has previously served in several positions within the Department of State, the Department of Justice and at the U.S. Agency for International Development during the Reagan and Bush administrations. Most recently he served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. A native of Maryland, he received both his bachelor's and law degrees from Yale University.

John R. Bolton resume on AEI web site

Research Areas
International relations, National security, Constitutional law

Professional Experience
Partner, law firm of Lerner, Reed, Bolton & McManus, LLP, 1993 present
President, National Policy Forum, 1995 1996
Senior fellow, Manhattan Institute, 1993
Assistant secretary for international organization affairs, Department of State,1989 1993
Assistant attorney general, Department of Justice, 1985 1989
Partner, law firm of Covington & Burling, 19831985; associate, 1974 1981
Assistant administrator for program and policy coordination, U.S. Agency for International Development, 1982 1983
General counsel, U.S. Agency for International Development, 1981 1982

Education J.D., Yale Law School, B.A., summa cum laude, Yale College
Senator Helms on John Bolton
?John Bolton is the kind of man with whom I would want to stand at Armageddon, if it should be my lot to be on hand for what is forecast to be the final battle between good and evil in this world. John is a great American of courage and wisdom. He loves his country and I appreciate his coming today to stand with me in my visit with you.? Speech at American Enterprise Institute, January 11, 2001

John Bolton in his own words:

Bolton On North Korea:
"While everyone can agree that we must seek to avoid a disastrous, and possibly nuclear, war on the Korean peninsula and beyond, it is unconscionable that the White House is unable to muster even a modicum of resoluteness to contain, let alone roll back, the North Korean threat .. . . A sounder U.S. policy would start by making it clear to the North that we are indifferent to whether we ever have "normal" diplomatic relations with it, and that achieving that goal is entirely in their interests, not ours. We should also make clear that diplomatic normalization with the U.S. is only going to come when North Korea becomes a normal country." Los Angeles Times, September 22, 1999

Bolton on test ban treaty:
"The Senate vote on the CTBT actually marks the beginning of a new realism on the issue of weapons of mass destruction and their global proliferation. Although undoubtedly a stinging and perhaps crippling humiliation for the Clinton administration, the Senate vote is also an unmistakable signal that America rejects the illusionary protections of unenforceable treaties.? The Jerusalem Post on October 18, 1999

Bolton on Taiwan:
"...diplomatic recognition of Taiwan would be just the kind of demonstration of U.S. leadership that the region needs and that many of its people hope for. For too long, Beijing has indulged in angry and intemperate language reminiscent of Nikita Khrushchev's performance at the United Nations when he pounded his shoe on his desk to express displeasure. Beijing should understand that such carrying on is not acceptable. The notion that China would actually respond with force is a fantasy, albeit one the Communist leaders welcome and encourage in the West." AEI web site, August 9, 1999

Bolton on UN arrears:
"Moreover, many Republicans in Congress and perhaps a majority not only do not care about losing the General Assembly vote but actually see it as a "make my day" outcome. Indeed, once the vote is lost, and the adverse consequences predicted by the U.N.'s supporters begin to occur, this will simply provide further evidence to many why nothing more should be paid to the U.N. system.(Moreover, even if the General Assembly vote is lost, we retain our Security Council seat and veto, which are far more important.)" Washington Times, October 24, 1998

Bolton on UN arrears:
CHARLAYNE HUNTERGAULT: Starting with you, Mr. Bolton, should the United States pay its U.N. dues now? JOHN BOLTON: Absolutely not. I think the most important thing to understand about this current debate is that there really is no financial crisis at the United Nations. What we do face is a crisis of U.N. legitimacy.? Newshour with Lehrer, February, 13 1997

Bolton on Kashmir:
"Other than the possibility of a nuclear war or even a nonnuclear conflagration across the subcontinent, the United States, quite frankly, has very little interest in the question of the political status of Kashmir." National Public Radio, March 3, 1999

Bolton on overthrowing Saddam:
" instead of simply whispering hopefully about a postS addam Iraq, the United States must state publicly and unequivocally that his removal is our paramount objective. In the process, we must encourage resistance not only by the Iraqi diaspora, but also by whatever dissident elements exist within the military and Saddam's governing structures. Right now, no other country believes that we are serious about removing Saddam from Baghdad. The world must be made to believe it. Indeed, Saddam's fate should be the catalyst for a larger debate about the legitimate uses of American military force: Should force be employed not only to solve an immediate strategic problem, but also to eliminate the regime which has precipitated it?? ?Who Really Won the Gulf War?," Weekly Standard, December 27, 1999

Bolton on the International Criminal Court
?Support for the International Criminal Court concept is based largely on emotional appeals to an abstract ideal of an international judicial system unsupported by any meaningful evidence and running contrary to sound principles of international crisis resolution.? House International Relations Committee, July 7, 2000
 

3) "Critical Mass" By Frank J. Gaffney Jr., Washington Times, 20 March 2001

While the Bush administration's pending decisions about missile defense and the size and costs of its effort to rebuild the U.S. military have been the focus of considerable attention and debate, a no-less-epochal review is under way - one that has, to date, received little public consideration.

In the course of last year's campaign, Candidate George W. Bush expressed a willingness to consider radically and unilaterally reducing the quantity and the alert status of America's nuclear forces - contributing to a new post-Cold War posture featuring an increasing reliance on anti-missile capabilities. As president, Mr. Bush has asked his administration to assess the wisdom and desirability of such initiatives.

If this study is done in a dispassionate and rigorous way, these are the sorts of responses he will shortly be receiving:

Extreme care should be exercised over further, deep reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons. The object of retaining a nuclear arsenal is, after all, not primarily to have sufficient means to fight an incalculably destructive war. Rather, it is to prevent one from happening. The greatest danger of all would be if the United States were to be seen to have so diminished its deterrent capabilities as to make the world "safe" for nuclear war.

Deterrence is not a science but an art. There is no objectively right or wrong answer as to the number of nuclear arms the United States "needs" to have; it is a question of risk. Contrary to the hoary theories of arms control, however, the risks appear greater when U.S. deterrent power is discounted than when it is overwhelming. It is, in short, infinitely better to err on the side of having too much nuclear capability than to have catalyzed, however unintentionally, circumstances in which nuclear weapons might wind up being used by having unduly diminished the credibility of one's deterrent.

This is especially true in an international environment that is as unpredictable as the present one. We cannot say for certain Russia's future course, but it seems unlikely that the former Soviet Union will become more benign in the years immediately ahead. For the moment, it is unable to afford large nuclear forces and would like us to agree to mirror-image the deep reductions economic considerations compel them to make. This would be a mistake; if the Kremlin reverts to form and marshals the resources to rebuild its offensive weaponry, negotiated limits will - as usual - wind up binding us, but not them.

For its part, China is determined to acquire great power status and the nuclear arms that it believes are appropriate to such a state. What is more, virtually every one of Russia and China's allies - what we call "rogue states" they call "clients" - are bent on acquiring atomic, if not thermonuclear, capabilities and are receiving help toward that end from Moscow and/or Beijing.

While the deployment of effective American missile defenses can - and should - mitigate somewhat the dangers that such trends represent, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to make further "deep" reductions below the roughly 3,500 U.S. nuclear warheads America planned to retain under the START II Treaty until such time as the beneficial effects of such anti-missile deployments are demonstrated in the diminution of proliferation and related threats to this country, its allies and interests.

The folly of unduly cutting the United States' nuclear deterrent would be greatly exacerbated were the nation deliberately to reduce the readiness of whatever strategic forces it decides to retain. Proponents of "de-alerting" America's strategic missiles claim this is an appropriate and necessary response to the danger that Russian weapons might be launched accidentally or without proper authorization.

This sort of thinking is reckless in the extreme. Effectively eliminating the United States's capability to respond with nuclear arms in a credible and prompt manner is unlikely to eliminate the problem of the Kremlin's "loose nukes"; they are the result of systemic forces (for example, a decentralized command-and-control system, deteriorating conditions and morale in the Russian military, corruption, etc.), not inadequate technology.

To its credit, the Bush administration appears to be reconsidering the enormously expensive programs its predecessor established in the name of "securing" the Kremlin's nuclear wherewithal. Rose Gottemoeller, the highly controversial Energy Department appointee who sought to fund these programs to the tune of $1.2 billion in fiscal 2002, has called the Bush team's reported plan to pare them back to "only" $800 million "a shame." What is, in fact, truly shameful has been the lack of accountability for these initiatives that has, according to successive critical reports by the General Accounting Office, enabled the funds to be used for, among other things, subsidizing the ongoing Russian nuclear modernization program.

Finally, the Bush nuclear review must address not only the need for a credible nuclear deterrent today; it must also ensure the safety, reliability and effectiveness of America's deterrent for the foreseeable future. This will require several politically difficult but vital steps - including, a resumption of limited, underground nuclear testing required both to continue to certify the existing stockpile and to design, develop and field the next generation of nuclear weapons upon which the nation will depend in the decades to come. The latter could include deep penetrating warheads capable of holding at risk the underground command posts that even rogue state regimes are acquiring today and an anti-missile warhead in case hit-to-kill missile defense technologies prove unworkable.

If President Bush receives and heeds such advice from his subordinates' nuclear review, chances are his legacy will be one of leaving the U.S. military not only better capable of fighting the nation's next war, but of preventing it from happening.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is the president of the Center for Security Policy and a columnist for The Washington Times.
 

4) "Missile Dealers at the Gates of Europe" By Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst,
Center for Defense Information http://www.cdi.org

The Bush-Cheney victory strengthened domestic support for National Missile Defense (NMD) and moved the focus of the debate away from the United States and into Europe. The continent's largest countries, long skeptical about the need for and the effectiveness of an NMD umbrella, are being wooed by Moscow and Washington to gain support for their competing points of view on missile defense.

In recent months both Russia and the United States have presented the Europeans with offers of collaboration on missile protection. But while there is strong interest in Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems in Europe, a static, NMD-like system may prove to be a much harder sell.

European objections to NMD, in a nutshell, revolve around two key issues. NMD, European leaders fear, may isolate America from Europe and weaken the U.S. commitment to European defense. It also threatens to destroy existing arms control agreements and unleash a new arms race.

The Bush national security team set about attacking the second argument by pointing out, with limited success, that ballistic missiles in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea may pose just as much risk to Europe as to the United States. These risks, the new Administration argues, require a change in existing arms control treaties. It is the first argument which garnered much attention lately. In response to worries about weakening the U.S. commitment to Europe, the Bush Administration proposed that NMD coverage be extended to European allies.

The Europeans are skeptical. Some countries agree the threat may be there but virtually all think that there are better ways of dealing with it, such as diplomacy and export controls.

Back in October 2000, Richard Armitage, then an advisor to Governor Bush and currently No. 2 at the State Department, proposed that the program be renamed from National Missile Defense to Allied Missile Defense to better reflect its new scope. President Bush has repeatedly stressed that NMD should also protect U.S. "friends and allies."

Even Moscow, after initially questioning the need for an NMD-like umbrella, proposed to NATO in February to jointly build a missile defense system for Europe. The closely-held proposal is vague on technical issues but it appears to be based on future upgrades of Russia's successful S-300 surface-to-air missile.

At first glance Europe appears to be a solid sales prospect for aspiring missile salesmen. Although skeptical about NMD, European countries have long pursued a more limited TMD system to protect their troops deployed in areas of conflict.

NATO is currently accepting bids for an alliance-wide TMD system with deployment planned for around 2010. Italy is working with the United States to build a Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), designed to guard against short-range ballistic and cruise missiles (Germany withdrew from the program in November 2000). The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy are in consultations with the United States about building a naval version of a TMD system to protect their fleets.

From a technical standpoint, an NMD system for Europe would basically be a TMD system. Europe is much closer to the countries the United States identified as possible sources of ballistic missile threats, meaning that any missile fired against Europe would follow a much shorter and shallower trajectory. The missile would be shot down not 100 miles above sea level (as NMD proposes to do), but at altitudes within the reach of TMD systems (the Patriot missiles used during the Gulf War had a maximum altitude of 15 miles).

Europe's future TMD systems could thus offer protection, albeit limited, to not only deployed forces but also static targets such as cities and ports, much as NMD proposes to do for the United States.

Does that mean that, in pursuing a TMD system, the European nations havealready embraced the missile defense concept embodied in NMD?

Not necessarily. European TMD projects are driven by a different rationale the need to protect troops deployed in areas of conflict. There is no disagreement that such protection is needed the Iraqi Scud missile attacks on U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War is just one example of the vulnerability of troops when deployed for war. TMD's technical capabilities would allow it to perform, in a limited form, essentially national missile defense duties, but here thesimilarities end.

NMD is designed to counter a missile attack against U.S. cities from a "rogue" country such as Iraq or North Korea. Many U.S. allies in Europe dismiss such scenario as far-fetched, pointing out that the conventional and nuclear might of the United States are sufficient to deter any such attack.

Of the largest states in Europe, Britain comes the closest to agreeing with the United States on the dangers of missile proliferation. Prime Minister Tony Blair, meeting with President Bush in February, called the spread of missile technology "a real threat and a present threat." But even Blair, in discussing a proper response to missile risks, urged a broader strategy that encompasses not just a military response but nuclear arms reductions and strengthening of missile proliferation controls and counter-proliferation measures.

Elsewhere, the differences between the United States and Europe are even more pronounced. In a study entitled "European Views of National Missile Defense," the Atlantic Council of the United States pointed out that "German military officials seem reluctant to acknowledge the new [ballistic missile] threats." Almost as a rule, the Atlantic Council wrote, European countries "emphasize the importance of engagement rather than isolation of countries of concern."

Moreover, the TMD systems sought by Europe would complement the existing arms control agreements. NMD, on the other hand, cannot be deployed without violating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. On this particular point, U.S. views could hardly be any more different from those in Europe.

President Bush stated that NMD will be deployed whether or not the United States can reach an agreement with Russia on revising the ABM Treaty. The Europeans are far more reluctant to trade the safety of arms control agreements for a (currently non-existent) missile defense umbrella.

"It is important that NMD does not proceed in a way which undermines the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," said UK Foreign Affairs Secretary Robin Cook. Russia and the United States may find selling a missile system to Europe a daunting proposal.

To make their task even more difficult, both the NMD and TMD plans are little more than pie in the sky at this point. The Russian proposal is based on a currently non-existent upgrade to the S-300 missile, dubbed S-500.

The U.S. NMD system may be further along in development but still far from proven. Of the three NMD tests conducted so far, two were complete failures and one missile found its target only with substantial coaching from the ground crew.

Mark Bromley
Analust
British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
Lafone House
11-13 Leathermarket Street
London SE1 3HN
Phone: +44 (0)20 7407 2977
Fax: +44 (0)20 7407 2988
Website: http://www.basicint.org