From: Mark Bromley
27 June 2001  NMD Update

There are six items this week. The first item details the latest news on US budgeting for the missile defence technologies. The request of $7.9 billion for fiscal year 2002 will mainly be used to accelerate the development of sea- and space based technologies.

The next two items detail an internal Defence Department study from last year which concluded that testing on the national missile defence program was behind schedule and unrealistic.

The following three items detail the views of the three senators to emerge from the recent shift in power in the Senate as the most influential over the direction of the US missile defence debate: Sen. Robert Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Whilst all three are committed to the principle of missile defence, they will offer stiff opposition to the Bush administration on issues like arms control and negotiations with Russia and China.

1) Bush Administration Plans Major Changes To Missile Defense Program?, InsideDefense.com, June 25, 2001
2) Pentagon Study Casts Doubt On Missile Defense Schedule, New York Times June 25, 2001, By James Dao
3) U.S. Lawmaker Accuses Pentagon of Suppressing Adverse NMD Report? By Gail Kaufman and Gopal Ratnam, Special to Space News, 13 June 2001
4) Quotes from Sen. Robert Byrd on national missile defense
5) Remarks by Joseph Biden, Jr., United States Senator
6) Senator Carl Levin on Missile Defense, Carnegie Proliferation Brief, Vol. 4, Number 12 Tuesday, June 05, 2001
 

1) Bush Administration Plans Major Changes To Missile Defense Programs, InsideDefense.com, June 25, 2001

The Bush administration will ask Congress for $7.9 billion to support a revamped missile defense program in fiscal year 2002, according to documents and sources.

The total is $2.2 billion more than the figure included in an earlier "placeholder" defense budget, states program budget decision No. 816, signed last week by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.

Some of the money will be used to accelerate the development of sea- and space-based missile defense technologies, the PBD states.

The document, obtained by InsideDefense.com, shows the Pentagon will scrap its current approach to developing missile defense systems by moving toward a technology effort that emphasizes the defeat of missiles in three stages: boost, midcourse and terminal.

"Preliminary results of the strategy review have determined that Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) programs should be restructured to provide simultaneous research in multiple areas against threats in the boost, midcourse and terminal stages of attack, and that sea, land air and space platforms should be explored to the fullest extent possible to mitigate those threats," the PBD states. "To achieve this, it is recommended that the current BMDO program be eliminated and replaced with a streamlined program designed to merge mature and emergent technologies in innovative ways as each new combination is proven.

"This approach will allow the Department to down-select the best alternative," the document continues. "It is planned after the selected platform is tested and proves the desired capability that it would transfer to the respective service for production and operation and support."

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has budget and program responsibility for the Pentagon?s missile defense programs and delegates execution authority to the military services. The Bush plan, however, takes three programs under BMDO?s control -- the Army?s Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and Medium Extended Air Defense System and the Navy?s Area Missile Defense -- and gives them back to the services. According to the PBD, these programs are mature enough in the acquisition cycle to be shifted to the services.

The Air Force will see three programs it now controls -- the Airborne Laser, the Space-based Laser, and the Space-Based Infrared System-Low -- given to BMDO, according to the PBD. Because the new BMDO program architecture calls for exploring and developing technologies that "span multiple platforms," these programs, and all money tied to them, will be shifted to BMDO?s purview.

"The BMDO budget will contain enough funding to transfer these systems back to the Air Force as they mature," according to the PBD.

The plan eliminates the program line separating a National Missile Defense program from those aimed at defending troops in a combat theater. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week that while there are distinct technical differences between the two areas, the operational differences boil down to semantics. "The point about theater and national missile defense that I have addressed is this: What is national depends on where you live," Rumsfeld said. "If you live in Europe and a missile can reach you, that?s national, it?s not theater. If you live in the United States and a missile can hit Europe, it?s theater, not national."

Separating the two programs makes it appear the United States is only interested in protecting itself and not deployed forces or European allies, Rumsfeld said.

According to the PBD, the new BMDO program is focused on five projects, each with its own funding line: $776 million for a ballistic missile defense project; $968 million for a terminal defense project; $3.9 billion for a midcourse defense project; $683 million for a boost-phase defense project; and $495 million for a sensors project.

Because the administration is creating a new BMDO program, it has to establish new program elements for each project, according to the PBD. BMDO is to coordinate with the Pentagon?s office of program analysis and evaluation to assign these new program elements.

"In addition, the major defense acquisition program structure is being significantly altered," the PBD states. Accordingly, BMDO and the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics "shall coordinate with the [office of general counsel] to resolve these changes through a legislative proposal as necessary."
Thomas Duffy

2) Pentagon Study Casts Doubt On Missile Defense Schedule?, New York Times June 25, 2001, By James Dao

WASHINGTON, June 24 - An internal Defense Department study concluded last year that testing on the national missile defense program was behind schedule and unrealistic and had suffered too many failures to justify deploying the system in 2005, a year after the Bush administration is considering deploying one.

The August 2000 report from the Pentagon's Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, only recently released to Congress, offers new details about problems the Pentagon has encountered in developing antimissile technology. And it raises questions about how quickly an effective system can be made operational.

The Pentagon is studying proposals to deploy a limited system - but one that would violate the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty - as soon as 2004. In recent weeks, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld has indicated a willingness to deploy a system before tests have been completed if an attack seems imminent.

But as an example of unrealistic testing, the report cited an October 1999 test in which a Global Positioning System inside a mock warhead helped guide an intercept missile toward a target over the Pacific. That test was successful, but two more recent flight tests failed.

None of those tests used the kinds of sophisticated decoys that a real ballistic missile would use to confuse an antimissile system, the report said. Instead, the decoy in each test was a large balloon that did not look like a warhead and that the kill vehicle's sensors could easily distinguish from the target.

The report also asserted that the Pentagon had not even scheduled a test involving multiple targets, the likely situation in an attack. And it found software problems with a training simulator that made it appear as if twice as many warheads had been fired at the United States as had been intended in a 1999 exercise.

The simulator then fired interceptors at those "phantom tracks," and operators were unable to override it, the report said.

The report, which President Bill Clinton read just before deferring initial construction on a missile system last September, acknowledged that the program was still in its early stages and was progressing well on some fronts. But it concluded that unless testing was significantly accelerated, at significantly higher cost, the program would not be ready for use against real attacks for several years.

"Deployment means the fielding of an operational system with some military utility which is effective under realistic combat conditions," the report states. "Such a capability is yet to be shown to be practicable for NMD," or national missile defense.

Officials with the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization disputed parts of the report, saying that the Global Positioning System used in the 1999 test did not guide the kill vehicle to the target. They also contended that the simulator did not fire at "phantom" missiles.

They acknowledged software problems with the simulator but said those flaws had been fixed. And they asserted that future tests, perhaps starting next year, would involve tougher situations, including more sophisticated decoys, multiple warheads and different trajectories.

"We fully intend to stress the system to its maximum capability," Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the organization, said.

But skeptics of missile defense said the report clearly showed that even the most advanced antimissile technology needed years of testing to work out unforeseen bugs. Without such testing, they warned, the system would be at best ineffective and at worst dangerous.

"The problems have been different each time," said Philip E. Coyle, a former assistant secretary of defense and director of operational testing, who helped write the report. "In each case, the thing that failed was something you'd have liked to have taken for granted. It just shows how hard this stuff is."

The report, which members of Congress plan to make public this week, is expected to fuel a contentious debate over how swiftly a missile system should be deployed and how much money should be spent developing one.

Mr. Rumsfeld has argued that the United States should deploy a system quickly to dissuade its rivals from trying to acquire ballistic missiles. He contends that no weapon system works perfectly and that a limited missile defense can be gradually improved and expanded.

During his recent trip to Europe, Mr. Rumsfeld gave NATO defense ministers a paper stating that the United States "will likely deploy test assets to provide rudimentary defenses to deal with emerging threats."

The Pentagon has also been studying a proposal from Boeing, the lead contractor on a missile defense system, to install a basic antimissile system involving five interceptors in Alaska by 2004. The system, which would violate the ABM treaty, would use existing radar and rockets as interim technology until more advanced systems were ready.

But in an appearance by Mr. Rumsfeld on Capitol Hill on Thursday, Democrats vigorously questioned those proposals and expressed strong reservations about speeding up a system they said remained unproven.

The Democrats have also raised concerns about the Bush administration's threat to withdraw from the ABM treaty if Russia refuses to amend it. Mr. Bush has argued that the treaty prevents the United States from testing promising technologies, like sea-based or airborne weapons.

Pentagon officials have said none of the tests planned through 2002 would violate the treaty. But aides to Mr. Rumsfeld are restructuring that schedule, possibly to add tests in a few months that could violate the treaty's prohibitions, a senior administration official said.

Though the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation's report is nearly a year old and does not contain classified information Pentagon officials asked the House Government Reform Committee, which obtained a copy, not to release it publicly, in part because they said it contained inaccuracies.

But Democrats contend that the Defense Department does not want damaging new details about its testing program to be released just as Mr. Rumsfeld is preparing to ask Congress to increase financing for missile defense research and development by $2.2 billion.

"In the mad rush to deploy, I suspect that any bad news is not what they want Congress to be debating or the public to be aware of," said Representative John F. Tierney, Democrat of Massachusetts, who has been a critic of missile defense. "This has huge ramifications. It should be part of the public dialogue and part of a very sober assessment of the system."
 

3) U.S. Lawmaker Accuses Pentagon of Suppressing Adverse NMD Report
By Gail Kaufman and Gopal Ratnam, Special to Space News, 13 June 2001

WASHINGTON - A key U.S. lawmaker asserts in a June 12 letter to top congressional leaders that the Pentagon repeatedly has suppressed an internal report that "highlights severe deficiencies" revealed in tests of the U.S. National Missile Defense program.

Rep. John Tierney, D-Mass., a House Government Reform Committee member has asked U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to explain why the Pentagon will not allow the public release of last August's National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Readiness Review written by Philip Coyle, former director of operational test and evaluation at the Pentagon.

Tierney asserts that Coyle's report has never been classified by the Department of Defense.

The Massachusetts legislator said in a separate June 12 letter to Rumsfeld that he wants by June 15 a "detailed justification of the Department's rationale for the continued suppression of the document." Space News obtained a copy of Tierney's letter.

After formally requesting six times that the Pentagon provide Congress a copy of Coyle's report on NMD, Tierney and members of congressional defense committees, received the 80-page report May 31. The cover letter of the report, signed by Stewart Aly, acting deputy general counsel, warns Congress that the Pentagon has not approved the release of the report and that it should be disclosed only to those who "have an official need to see it." A congressional source told Space News that Tierney will release the report to the public early next week if Rumsfeld does not provide this information.

In a June 12 letter to Rep. Christopher Shays, R-Conn., chairman of the Government Reform subcommittee on national security, veterans affairs and international relations, Tierney quotes Coyle's report, which lays out the hazards of deploying an imperfect missile defense system.

For example, in simulated tests, Coyle describes a malfunction of the NMD's command and control system, during which it was confused by signals from different radars tracking the same incoming missile. The command and control system mistakenly identified the signal of a second tracking radar as that of a second incoming missile. During the simulated test, the command and control system then launched interceptors at the nonexistent missile, Tierney wrote in referring to Coyle's report.

Tierney noted that phantom tracks arise when radar coverage makes a transition from one radar to another.

"Efforts to manually override such launches, moreover, were unsuccessful," Tierney quoted the report as saying. "One can imagine the potential hazards that could arise in future deployment scenarios if the United States launches multiple interceptors against missiles that do not exist," Tierney said. "One immediate danger in these types of situations is that adversaries may interpret these launches as a hostile first strike and respond accordingly."

Tierney also told Shays that if the administration of President George W. Bush wants to implement a system by 2004, it only strengthens the need to hold more congressional hearings and for the General Accounting Office to conduct an investigation.

4) Quotes from Sen. Robert Byrd on national missile defense Courtesy of the Council for a Livable World www.clw.org

"While I support the deployment of an effective missile defense system, there are a number of reasons why I believe it is not as easy to build such a system as it is to declare the intent to build it. "

"It must also be recognized that no matter how robust missile defense technology might become, it will always--now and forever--be of limited use."

"We should not let the flashy idea of missile defense distract us from other, and perhaps more serious, threats to our national security."

"That means that if we were to station a handful of interceptors in Alaska in 2004, there is no guarantee--none, no guarantee that they would provide any useful defense at all . . . I do not support the deployment of a multi-billion dollar scarecrow that will not be an effective defense if a missile is actually launched at the United States."

"It is no wonder that Russia and our European allies are confused as to whether we are consulting with them on the future of the ABM Treaty, or we are simply informing them as to what the future of the ABM Treaty will be. We must listen to our allies, and take their comments seriously."

Full text of statement by Senator Robert Byrd NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE -- (Senate floor speech - June 25, 2001)

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the President has recently concluded his trip to Europe, where he attempted to convince European leaders of the need for the United States to deploy a national missile defense system. It seems that our friends in Europe still have the same reservations about this apparent rush to a missile shield, and I can understand why. While I support the deployment of an effective missile defense system, there are a number of reasons why I believe it is not as easy to build such a system as it is to declare the intent to build it.

One cannot underestimate the scientific challenge of deploying an effective national missile defense system. The last two anti-missile tests, performed in January and July of 2000, were failures. In response to these failures, the Department of Defense did the right thing. The Department of Defense took a time-out to assess what went wrong, and to explore how it can be fixed. The next test, scheduled for July of this year of our Lord 2001, will be a crucial milestone for the national missile defense program. All eyes will be watching to see if the technological and engineering problems can be addressed, or if we have to go back to the drawing board once more.

It must also be recognized that no matter how robust missile defense technology might become, it will always--now and forever--be of limited use. I fear that in the minds of some, a national missile defense system is the sine qua non of a safe and secure United States. But the most sophisticated radars or space-based sensors will never be able to detect the sabotage of our drinking water supplies by the use of a few vials-just a few vials--of a biological weapon, and no amount of anti-missile missiles will prevent the use of a nuclear bomb neatly packaged in a suitcase and carried to one of our major cities. We should not let the flashy idea of missile defense distract us from other, and perhaps more serious, threats to our national security.

If deployment of a missile defense system were to be expedited, there is the question of how effective it could possibly be. Military officers involved in the project have called a 2004 deployment date ``high risk.'' That means that if we were to station a handful of interceptors in Alaska in 2004, there is no guarantee--none, no guarantee that they would provide any useful defense at all. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has downplayed this problem, saying that an early system does not have to be 100 percent effective. I believe that if we are going to pursue a robust missile shield, that is what we should pursue. I do not support the deployment of a multi-billion dollar scarecrow that will not be an effective defense if a missile is actually launched at the United States.

The New York Times has printed an article that drives this point home. The newspaper reports on a study by the Pentagon's Office of Operational Test and Evaluation that details some of the problems that a National Missile Defense system must overcome before it can be considered effective. According to the New York Times, the authors of this internal Department of Defense report believe that the missile defense program has ``suffered too many failures to justify deploying the system in 2005, a year after the Bush administration is considering deploying one.''

The article goes on to state that system now being tested has benefited from unrealistic tests, and that the computer system could attempt to shoot down inbound missiles that don't even exist. If the Department of Defense's own scientists and engineers don't trust the system that could be deployed in the next few years, this system might not even be a very good scarecrow. Let the scientists and engineers find the most effective system possible, and then go forward with its deployment.

Let us also consider our international obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. The President has begun discussions with Russia, China, our European allies, and others on revising the ABM Treaty, but so far the responses have been mixed. I suggest that it is because our message is mixed. On one hand, there is the stated intent to consult with our allies before doing away with the ABM Treaty. On the other, the Administration has made clear its position that a missile defense system will be deployed as soon as possible.

It is no wonder that Russia and our European allies are confused as to whether we are consulting with them on the future of the ABM Treaty, or we are simply informing them as to what the future of the ABM Treaty will be. We must listen to our allies, and take their comments seriously. The end result of the discussions with Russia, China, and our European allies should be an understanding of how to preserve our national security, not a scheme to gain acceptance from those countries of our plan to rush forward with the deployment of an anti-missile system at the earliest possible date.

What's more, Secretary of State Colin Powell said this past weekend that the President may unilaterally abandon the ABM Treaty as soon as it conflicts with our testing activities. According to the recently released Pentagon report on missile defense, however, the currently scheduled tests on anti-missile systems will not conflict with the ABM Treaty in 2002, and there is no conflict anticipated in 2003. Why, therefore, is there a rush to amend or do away with the ABM Treaty? Who is to say that there will not be additional test failures in the next two and a half years that will further push back the test schedule, as well as potential conflicts with the ABM Treaty?

There is also the issue of the high cost of building a national missile defense system. This year, the United States will spend $4.3 billion on all the various programs related to missile defense. From 1962 to today, the Brookings Institution estimated that we have spent $99 billion, and I donot believe that for all that money, our national security has been increased one bit.

The Congressional Budget Office in an April 2000 report concluded that the most limited national missile defense system would cost $30 billion. This system could only hope to defend against a small number of unsophisticated missiles, such as a single missile launched from a rogue nation. If we hope to defend against the accidental launch of numerous, highly sophisticated missiles of the type that are now in Russia's arsenal, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the cost will almost double, to $60 billion.

We have seen how these estimates work. They have only one way to go. That is always up.

However, that number may even be too low. This is what the Congressional Budget Office had to say in March 2001: ``Those estimates from April 2000 may now be too low, however. A combination of delays in testing and efforts by the Clinton administration to reduce the program's technical risk (including a more challenging testing program) may have increased the funding requirements well beyond the levels included in this option [for national missile defense systems].'' Is it any wonder that some critics believe that a workable national missile defense system will cost more than $120 billion?

Tell me. How does the Administration expect to finance this missile defense system? The $1.35 trillion tax cut that the President signed into law last month is projected to consume 72 percent of the non-Social Security, non-Medicare surpluses over the next five years. In fact, under the budget resolution that was passed earlier this year, the Senate Budget Committee shows that the Federal Government is already projected to dip into the Medicare trust fund in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. The missile defense system envisioned by the Administration would likely have us dipping into the Social Security trust funds as well--further jeopardizing the long-term solvency of both Federal retirement programs. This is no way to provide for our nation's defense.

I must admit that I am also leery about committing additional vast sums to the Pentagon. I was the last man out of Vietnam--the last one. I mean to tell you, I supported President Johnson. I supported President Nixon to the hilt.

I have spoken before about the serious management problems in the Department of Defense. I am a strong supporter of the Department of Defense. When it came to Vietnam, I was a hawk--not just a Byrd but a hawk. I am not a Johnny-come-lately when it comes to our national defense.

As Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, I find it profoundly disturbing that the Department of Defense cannot account for the money that it spends, and does not know with any certainty what is in its inventory. These problems have been exposed in detail by the Department's own Inspector General, as well as the General Accounting Office. Ten years after Congress passed the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, the Department of Defense has still not been able to pass an audit of its books. The Pentagon's books are in such disarray that outside experts cannot even begin an audit, much less reach a conclusion on one!

Although it does not directly relate to this issue of national missile defense, I was shocked by a report issued by the General Accounting Office last week on the Department of Defense's use of emergency funds intended to buy spare parts in 1999. Out of $1.1 billion appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999 to buy urgently needed spare parts, the GAO reported that the Pentagon could not provide the financial information to show that 92 percent of those funds were used as intended. This is incredible. This Senate passed that legislation to provide that money for spare parts. That is what they said they needed it for. That is what we appropriated it for. Congress gave the Department of Defense over a billion dollars to buy spare parts, which we were told were urgently needed, and we cannot even see the receipt!

If the Department of Defense cannot track $1 billion that it spent on an urgent need, I don't know how it could spend tens of billions of dollars on a missile defense system with any confidence that it is being spent wisely.

As a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Administrative Co-Chairman of the National Security Working Group, along with my colleague, Senator COCHRAN, who was the author of the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, I understand that ballistic missiles are a threat to the United States. I voted for the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, which stated that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as it is technologically possible. Now, I still support that act. But I also understand that an effective national missile defense system cannot be established through intent alone. Someone has said that the road to Sheol is paved with good intentions. Good intentions are not enough. I think there might be a way toward an effective missile defense system, and it is based on common sense. Engage our friends, and listen to our critics. Learn from the past, and invest wisely. Test carefully, and assess constantly. But most of all, avoid haste. We cannot afford to embark on a folly that could, if improperly managed, damage our national security, while costing billions of dollars.

5) Remarks by Joseph Biden, Jr., United States Senator: 'Non-Proliferation: A Battle We All Must Win', Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 19, 2000

http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Conference%202001/biden.htm

Good afternoon. It's a real delight to address a conference chaired by Joe Cirincione, because usually he is the witness giving us the good word. I have always tried to treat him well when he testified before us, and I guess from his generous introduction that I haven't done badly in that regard.

I will not say that it's a delight to speak on non-proliferation. Frankly, the potential for destruction posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction does more to keep me up at night than any other threat to world security.

But I take heart from the presence here of such knowledgeable experts and officials. We must all work together to combat proliferation, and this annual Carnegie Endowment conference has become a major forum for sharing ideas and forging international cooperation.

My perspective comes from the experience of a quarter century on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Over those years, I think I have learned four lessons about non-proliferation:

1.Proliferation is almost inevitably an uncomfortable issue;
2.Success in non-proliferation depends upon persistence -- often for several years or more;
3.Success nearly always requires positive incentives, not just sanctions; and
4.The United States must take the lead in non-proliferation efforts, but the rest of the world must also help.

Why is proliferation always an uncomfortable issue? Because it is an irritant in our relations with countries. It almost always pulls us away from closer relations, be they with Russia, China, India and Pakistan, or elsewhere.

Regional specialists bemoan our fixation on protecting the world from weapons of mass destruction. But, as the old bumper sticker used to say, "one nuclear bomb can really spoil your day." And so can a chemical or biological weapon.

Precisely because proliferation is an uncomfortable issue, we must institutionalize it. That is the only way to ensure this issue a seat at the table when foreign policy decisions are made.

That's why we have a Bureau for Non-Proliferation in the State Department. That's also why Senator Helms and I created a separate Bureau for Verification and Compliance, with authority to analyze compliance with nonproliferation regimes.

Why is proliferation such a hard issue? Why is my second lesson the need for persistence? Because demand breeds supply -- just as with narcotics.

Countries that want weapons of mass destruction are pretty desperate. They pay good money for what they need. They buy from many suppliers, use front companies, and pursue multiple paths of development. We can slowdown their efforts, raise the price of proliferation, and interdict some sales. Those are worthy pursuits, even essential ones.

But stemming the supply only buys us time. For lasting success in non-proliferation, we must also affect the demand side of the equation.

That brings me to my third lesson, the need for positive inducements. In East Asia, the inducement has been a close security relationship with the United States. In three former Soviet states, it was world acceptance and assistance. In South America, it was intensive and extended efforts to reduce regional rivalries. In South Africa, it was the world's blessing on a new regime.

Are there positive inducements that would make a difference for North Korea? For Iran? For India and Pakistan? There may be.

We who care about proliferation must care about -- and treat -- the causes of proliferation, not just the symptoms. We must take seriously the security dilemmas of "demand side" countries.

We must also take seriously the concerns of "supply side" countries. Just as we use crop substitution in the fight against international narcotics, so must we offer a decent life to those who forego proliferation.

There can be no doubt as to who must take the lead in these matters. No other country comes close to the United States in its ability to offer economic or security incentives in return for foreswearing or giving up weapons of mass destruction.

How must we lead? One way is by remaining engaged in the peaceful resolution of conflict. One reason -- among many -- that we cannot walk away from the Middle East conflict is that another war there could involve weapons of mass destruction.

The same is true in South Asia. We must encourage India, Pakistan, and the countries that support them to search for new approaches to security in the region. We must also find a way to promote non-proliferation in South Asia without relying upon ineffective sanctions.

It might help, of course, if we would show leadership in the field of arms control, which is so closely tied to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

There is no excuse for our failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. There are legitimate concerns regarding Stockpile Stewardship and verification capabilities. But we must address those concerns as proposed by General John Shalikashvili -- and then ratify the treaty.

Were we to do that, I have no doubt that we could then convince India and Pakistan to do the same.

To improve our verification capabilities, we must both maintain our National Technical Means and complete the International Monitoring System. That international network of nuclear test sensors offers us data that we simply cannot obtain by ourselves, data that have the special advantage of being usable in open diplomacy.

It would be utterly foolish to cast aside the International Monitoring System, out of some misguided notion that our participation in it constituted implementation of an unratified treaty.

There is also no excuse for choosing a missile defense that leads China to vastly increase its nuclear forces, with a ripple effect on India and Pakistan. Our desire for a national missile defense is understandable, but that does not make it prudent to deploy a mediocre defense or to needlessly abrogate the ABM Treaty.

I don't want to turn this into a speech on national missile defense. My concerns are well known. So is my belief that it may be possible to craft a defense -- and an amended ABM Treaty -- so as not to threaten Russia or China's nuclear deterrent capabilities.

My point today is that our actions on missile defense may well affect our non-proliferation efforts. To succeed in non-proliferation, we need the cooperation of both Russia and China. Any rational missile defense policy will take that need into account.

Another area in which positive incentives and U.S. leadership are crucial is in helping Russia to meet its arms control obligations, safeguard its sensitive materials, find new careers for tens of thousands of weapons experts, and protect against improper exports of weapons of mass destruction materials or technology. These programs are of tremendous benefit to our national security.

How strange it is, then, that the Administration cut these valuable non-proliferation programs in next year's budget. Yes, these programs cost money. But the benefits that they deliver -- in weapons dismantled, in fissile material protected from diversion to terrorists or rogue states, and in scientists working on socially useful projects, rather than wandering off to Libya or Iraq -- are incalculable.

Just think how much we will have to spend if Osama bin Laden gets nuclear weapons.

The Administration is reviewing our assistance to Russia. That's fine. We should be more efficient, getting more of the funds to the Russians (and others) who need it. We should improve our ability to ensure that our assistance is used properly.

We should also coordinate our many programs, which is why Senator Hagel and I introduced a bill mandating an interagency committee for that purpose.

When all that is done, however, we need a much greater effort, rather than budget cuts. As Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler made clear in testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee, the last thing we want is for Russia to become the world's shopping center for sensitive materials.

Is there good work that we could do, with more funding? You bet there is! The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, in the Department of Energy, has a growing "waiting list" of good projects to fund, with U.S. firms willing to more than match our assistance. Unless we increase the budget for this program, it will stagnate.

Congress may restore the 8-percent budget cut that the Administration imposed on this program. But we should double the funding for these projects -- and also for the International Science and Technology Centers program, in the State Department.

Another program that should be doubled is the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting program in the Energy Department. This program safeguards Russia's fissile material.

Russia has over a thousand metric tons of highly enriched uranium, plus 150 metric tons of plutonium. I'm told that's enough to make 42 thousand nuclear weapons. That's a lot of material to protect.

Securing all this material won't be easy. Some old-school Russians see this as a plot to spy on them. But the truth is, we offer improved security at minimal risk to Russia's nuclear weapons secrets.

President Putin should tell his new Minister of Atomic Energy -- who has worked with U.S. programs and knows they are workable -- to let us help safeguard all of MINATOM's stocks of fissile material.

We must succeed in this. Howard Baker told the Foreign Relations Committee:

"I am a little short of terrified at some of the storage facilities for nuclear material and nuclear weapons [in Russia]; and relatively small investments can yield enormous improvements in storage and security."

And Sam Nunn warns: "No one knows how long the present window of opportunity will remain open."

It will be equally daunting to help Russia downside its bloated nuclear weapons complexes without leaving its scientists desperate for jobs. But again, we have no choice. As Sam Nunn put it, "We dare not risk a world where a Russian scientist can take care of his children only by endangering ours."

How will we get the funds needed for non-proliferation from an Administration dedicated to missile defense and the tax cut? That's a big problem.

One idea is "debt for non-proliferation" swaps. Senator Lugar and I authored "debt for nature" legislation a while back, and maybe we could forgive some of Russia's debts if the debt payments were used for non-proliferation programs. This is not a panacea, but it might help.

By the way, other countries could do the same thing. Russia owes much more money to Europe than it does to the United States. Remember my fourth lesson: the United States must lead; but others must help, as well.

Other countries do contribute to existing programs in Russia. Too often, however, funds are tied to projects that will benefit the contributors economically. I understand the urge to profit from foreign assistance. But if we support only projects with an economic payback, we could fail to secure our security objective. We must keep non-proliferation as our major funding criterion.

Another area in which we must all work together is to stem the proliferation threat posed by North Korea. Not just the United States, but also Russia, China, Europe and Japan must persuade North Korea to reach a verifiable agreement to end its long-range missile production -- and its sales of such missiles, materials or technology -- in return for a reasonable international assistance package.

Russia has a particular responsibility in this regard, as its leaders say there is no need for a national missile defense to handle the threat of North Korean missiles. Russia has experience with verification, so President Putin should convince North Korean President Kim Jong-il to accept it.

Other countries also have a role to play in the imposition and enforcement of international sanctions. The history of unilateral sanctions is hardly encouraging. But when the world stands firm, sanctions can succeed.

The trouble, of course, is that it hurts a country to impose sanctions. We get back to that first lesson: proliferation is an uncomfortable issue. It is uncomfortable for other countries, just as it is for the United States.

But isn't that why we are here today? If this were an easy issue to treat, we wouldn't be gathering here, year after year.

Nonproliferation is like the labors of Sisyphus, and it gets harder as we get older. But remember how frightened we were a generation ago. Recall the predictions of a nuclear holocaust, and of 20 or 30 nuclear weapon states by the year 2000.

Non-proliferation works. It isn't fun; it isn't easy; it isn't quick -- but it works. So we must increase our efforts, rather than giving up hope or fixating on the difficulties.

At the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Franklin said: "We must indeed all hang together, or most assuredly, we shall all hang separately." This is especially true in the fight against proliferation.

Remember that we won the American Revolution. Halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a task no less difficult, but also no less noble. And if we all hang together again, we can win this war as well.
 

6) Senator Carl Levin on Missile Defense, Carnegie Proliferation Brief, Vol. 4, Number 12 Tuesday, June 05, 2001

http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/Publications.asp?p=8&Publicati onID=709

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), the soon-to-be chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, spoke at the National Defense University on May 11, 2001. The following are excerpted remarks from Senator Levin's speech. To link to the full text of the statement, visit the Non-Proliferation Project's web page: www.ceip.org/npp

If we simply walk away from the ABM Treaty with no alternative framework for mutual understanding and strategic stability in place, we could find ourselves in a more dangerous, rather than a less dangerous world. How?

If Russia concludes that our missile deployment plans are a search for unilateral advantage - rather than for mutual security - then it will try to deny us that advantage. Despite Russia's current economic plight, nobody should fool themselves into believing that Russia cannot take actions that would reduce our security. Russia already has sophisticated penetration aids and countermeasures that could overwhelm our planned missiles defenses. They could develop additional countermeasures or share their existing or future technology in this area with other nations.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or fissile material in the hands of people who would use them remains the greatest threat to our security. Keep in mind that Russia has enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium for some 60,000-80,000 nuclear weapons - a proliferation nightmare waiting to become a reality if we do not work hard with Russia to reduce that threat. The bipartisan task force on non-proliferation led by former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler concluded recently that "the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home."

Taking into consideration Russia's possible response to our deployment of an NMD system is not tantamount to giving Russia a veto. It is giving us vital information to consider when deciding whether a unilateral deployment involving abrogation of a treaty makes us more or less secure.

We must also think about China. If China believes our NMD system is designed to negate its nuclear deterrent, it could increase its nuclear forces far beyond what it would otherwise do. This could lead India and Pakistan to reciprocate. We should be very cautious about taking a step that could result in many more nuclear weapons in China, prompting a buildup in India and Pakistan, thus increasing the likelihood that any conflict between them would involve nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, even if we deploy missile defenses we will remain vulnerable to non-missile attacks from weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical or biological weapons delivered by ship, plane, truck or suitcase - which the Intelligence Community and the Joint Chiefs of staff both agree are more likely than attacks using long-range ballistic missiles.

The North Koreans are developing long-range missile technology to gain diplomatic leverage and clout in a crisis. It is almost inconceivable that North Korea would ever launch a missile at the U.S., because regime survival is their number-one priority, according to the Intelligence Community. The one way they will guarantee their own destruction is to launch a ballistic missile at the U.S. The Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea says that U.S. and South Korean troops successfully deterred North Korea since the Korean War, and our forces are getting more capable all the time. Do we really want to increase the danger of proliferation, our greatest threat, to partly meet one of the least likely threats to our security a North Korean missile attack?

So, let me offer a few specific ideas on what I think the Administration should do relative to NMD:

We should proceed with robust research and development of NMD systems and technology.

We should conduct R&D on boost-phase technologies that may have application to intercepting long-range missiles from nations such as North Korea and Iran. This may be an area where we can reach agreement with Russia.

We should not rush any NMD system to deployment before it is ready and has demonstrated through repeated and realistic testing that it is reliable and operationally effective. The land-based NMD system that is under development is the most mature technology. Yet General Welch thought last year that it was unlikely we could deploy it by 2005. The schedule has slipped further since then.

DOD should expand and improve the NMD test program to demonstrate the operational effectiveness of any system proposed for deployment before deciding to deploy it.

The Administration should work closely with Congress to discuss its missile defense plans and programs, and how they will increase our security and avoid greater proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, we should match rhetoric with reality. That means really discussing and consulting with our allies, with Russia, and with China on this issue before committing to deployment of an NMD system.

Mark Bromley
Analyst
British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
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