From: Basic
Sent: 01 June 2001
Subject: BASIC Report From NATO Meeting

"ABM Treaty Dropped By NATO Amid Changing Circumstances", Christine Kucia, BASIC

BUDAPEST, 31 MAY - Ministers of the 19 NATO states agreed at their biannual meeting a final communiqué that omitted reference to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which effectively overturned preceding statements that reaffirmed Alliance support for the U.S.-Russian agreement, and ushered into NATO new language that could sanction the U.S.?s unilateral nuclear activities.

The most recent communiqué does not address the ABM Treaty in part due to 'changing circumstances' globally, according to NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. The final statement from this meeting indicates a shift in tenor from December 2000, when foreign ministers called for 'preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.'

US Secretary of State Colin Powell gave an early indication of the Bush administration's sense of achievement in this meeting, stating that he was 'pleased that [the ABM Treaty] didn't warrant particular attention this time around.'

However, the deafening silence of European allies on the ABM Treaty may be a critical step toward the end for the ABM Treaty and the beginning of more serious national missile defense discussions. Prior statements from key European allies, concerned about relations with Russia, called for keeping the ABM Treaty and perhaps agreeing an amendment to cover new technologies. With allies quiet on the issue, the United States may move forward with deployment decisions on a missile defense plan that could breach the treaty.

Europe Divides and Conquers
European allies claimed their own success, however, in stymieing U.S. efforts to have allies endorse the presence of a ?common threat,? which would be a fundamental reason to establish missile defenses in the United States and/or Europe. France and Germany responded strongly to the draft language, countering that the document instead should cite a ?potential threat.? The foreign ministers concluded that the Alliance should ?address appropriately and effectively the threats that the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery can pose.? Further, the text calls for continued consultations that ?will include appropriate assessment of threats.?

Division between the United States and a few key allies over the threat issue reportedly delayed the communiqué?s issue at the meeting. The dispute led observers to believe that this instance belies a deeper divide in the Alliance over the future of its defense role.

Other Nuclear Issues Weakened
However, other nuclear issues addressed in the communiqué indicated that Europe was more accommodating to American intentions. NATO member states gave an early indication that they would support U.S. unilateral arsenal cuts when they ?welcome[d] the US commitment to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons.? Absent mention of formalizing the reductions through treaties, this line amounts to an endorsement of unilateral cuts that, while welcome, could prove unverifiable and reversible in the future.

The communiqué also toned down the language on nuclear testing. While in December 2000 NATO states professed that they ?remain committed to an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),? the Alliance merely encouraged all states to continue to refrain from nuclear testing. This change takes the heat off of the United States, the sole NATO member state that has not ratified the treaty, to do so in the near future.

The START treaties received won a modest nod from NATO, which recognized the historic success of the process. However, the foreign ministers then professed support for the much-vaguer concept of ?achieving further reductions of the number of strategic nuclear weapons.? In not calling for progress specifically on STARTs II and III, as in December, the ministers potentially rendered the process dead.

What Will NATO Agree in Brussels?
European allies have put themselves in a difficult spot as next week?s meeting of NATO defense ministers approaches. Communiqués from the defense ministerials, which include the Defense Planning Committee/Nuclear Planning Group (DPC/NPG) statement, tend to be more aggressive on nuclear policy than the diplomatically-oriented documents from the foreign ministers. The expectation that U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will bring some new information on possible U.S. NMD plans also heightens the importance of this meeting for issues surrounding weapons of mass destruction.

Last year's communiqué of the DPC/NPG upheld the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), supported ratification and early entry into force of the CTBT, and urged progress on STARTs II and III. These statements illustrate that NATO places ?continued importance? to full implementation of and compliance with international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.? These statements will be watched in the wake of the changed tone by the foreign ministers, and in light of allegations that the United States attempted to remove the reference to the NPT as ?the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament? from the Budapest communiqué.

In the document, the Alliance?s nuclear posture also was defined. It stated, ?NATO's nuclear forces are a credible and effective element of the Alliance's strategy of preventing war, and they are maintained at the minimum level of sufficiency to preserve peace and stability? Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance.?

These points from the December 2000 DPC/NPG will be carefully monitored next week, as NATO defense ministers conclude a final document refining the Alliance?s stance on nuclear issues. The suspected divide in the Alliance between the United States and Europe may be seen better at that meeting, when NATO?s all-important nuclear policy, and Bush?s plans for NMD deployment, are at the fore.

For further information:

Final Communiqué of the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, Budapest, 29 May 2001:
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-077e.htm

Communiqués from Prior NATO Ministerial Meetings:
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm.htm

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Site - Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers:
http://www.clw.org/coalition/ctbindex.htm

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START): Documents, Analysis, and News - Arms Control Association
http://www.armscontrol.org/ASSORTED/s3index.html

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document - BASIC
http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/revcon2000/FinalDocAdvance.htm

Mark Bromley
Analyst
British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
Lafone House
11-13 Leathermarket Street
London SE1 3HN
Phone: +44 (0)20 7407 2977
Fax: +44 (0)20 7407 2988
Website: http://www.basicint.org